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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

SELF-INCRIMINATION -

A NEW STATE STANDARD
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
In 1908, the United States Supreme Court decided Twining v. New
Jersey.' For fifty-six years this decision represented the Supreme Court's
view that the federal constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
was not applicable to state criminal processes. In Twining, the defendant
refused to take the witness stand in a criminal action. The prosecutor
commented extensively on this failure of the defendant to testify in his
own behalf. At that time, New Jersey law permitted a prosecutor to comment on the fact that the defendant had failed to testify in his own behalf
from which the jury could draw an inference of guilt.2 The defendant excepted, asserting that this procedure dissipated his right against self-incrimination. In reversing the New Jersey decision, the Supreme Court of
the United States summarized the question as follows:
The general question, therefore, is, whether such a law violates the Fourteenth Amendment, either by abridging the privileges or immunities of citipersons of their life, liberty
zens of the United States, or by depriving
or property without due process of law.3
The Court held that "due process" may impliedly contain a prohibition
against self-incrimination, but, that right is not safeguarded by the fifth
amendment in state criminal proceedings. In a portent of the future, the
Court, in dismissing Twining's appeal, stated:
It is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first
eight Amendments against national action may also be safeguarded

against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due

process of law.4

The hesitant quaere announced by the Court has become all but absolute. Malloy v. Hogan5 which made the self-incrimination clause of the
fifth amendment applicable to state prosecutions is another landmark
decision in the tradition of Gitlow v. New York,6 Mapp v. Ohio' and
Gideon v. Wainright.8 The Court in Malloy unequivocally stated their
holding.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

211 U.S. 78 (1908).
State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N.J.L. 619, 55 At!. 743 (1903).
211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908).
Id. at 99. (Emphasis added.)
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
268 U.S. 652 (1925). (first amendment.)
367 U.S. 643 (1961). (fourth amendment.)
372 U.S. 335 (1963). (sixth amendment.)

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:797

We hold today that the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory

self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against
abridgement by the States.9

An analysis of the facts in Malloy show that the petitioner, Malloy,
was arrested for gambling in Connecticut. Upon registering a plea of
guilty, he was fined and sentenced to one year in prison. After his release,
the county in which he had been arrested initiated an inquiry into local
gambling activity. As a convicted gambler, Malloy was "prevailed upon" to
testify at the county's hearing on this matter. The questions put to Malloy
were designed to elicit information about his activities at the time of the
arrest. The petitioner refused to answer any questions on the grounds
that his answers might tend to incriminate him. He was subsequently
cited and convicted for contempt. The petitioner's writ of habeas corpus
was denied by the lower state court and the Connecticut Supreme Court of
Errors affirmed that decision.'" The issue before the Connecticut court
was whether Malloy's refusal to answer was justified under the rules governing the exercise of the privilege." The court reasoned that the test
applied in answering a question was simply whether it would incriminate
or tend to incriminate. In applying this test to the repeated refusals of
Malloy to testify, the court concluded that the anticipated answers to the
referee's questions could not have, under the circumstances from which the
questions arose, incriminated him. Therefore, he should have answered the
questions.
The United States Supreme Court, in reversing the Connecticut court's
decision, stated:
The conclusions of the Court of Errors, tested by the federal standard,
fail to make sufficient account of the setting in which the questions
were asked .... An affirmative answer . . . might well have either connected petitioner with a more recent crime, or at least have operated as a
waiver of2 his privilege with reference to his relationship with a possible

criminal.'

The Court's decision in Malloy is not surprising. After Mapp and
Gideon, one would not have to be clairvoyant to predict this result. What
is surprising, however, and indeed welcomed, is the degree of precision in
the Court's opinion.
Unlike Mapp there is no question in Malloy as to the standard applicable to the states. Prior to Mapp, there appeared to be three measures
of conduct with respect to criminal procedure. Insofar as state criminal
processes were concerned, the due process standard of the fourteenth
9.
10.
11.
12.

378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
Malloy v. Hogan, 150 Conn. 220, 187 A.2d 744, cert. granted, 373 U.S. 948 (1963).
Ibid.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 13-14. (Emphasis added).
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amendment was, of course, the traditional measure of state action."3 However in the federal system, the federal supervisory standard established
by the Supreme Court was, and is, another measure of conduct.' 4 Somewhat more nebulous than either the federal supervisory standard or the
fourteenth amendment standard was the conduct required by the Constitution itself.'5 After the Mapp decision, there was a great deal of confusion in attempting to ascertain what standard was applicable to the states.
Although it was clear that the Court had overruled the rather loose "due
process" standard required by the fourteenth amendment, it was not dear
whether the Court was applying the constitutional standard of "unreasonableness," or whether the more stringent federal supervisory standard was to
be applied in subsequent cases. Fortunately, after Ker v. Californiat' it was

dear, at least with respect to the fourth amendment, that the federal supervisory standard and the standard of conduct required by the fourth
amendment were one and the same. Thus, it was only after Ker that it
could be said with authority that the Mapp case applied the federal supervisory standard to the states via the due process clause, of the fourteenth
amendment.'
However, the explicit language in Malloy avoids a similar dispute. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, leaves no room
for doubt as to the applicable standard. He states:
We have held that the guarantees of the First Amendment, Gitlow v.
New York'S] . .. the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures of

the Fourth Amendment, Ker v. California[191 ... and the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, Gideon v. Wainright [ 2 0] . . . are
all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment
accordingto the same standards that protect those personal rights against
federal encroachment.2

Thus, the notion that the due process standard of the fourteenth amendment
presents a "watered-down" guarantee of individual liberty is rejected. Justice Brennan then states that the outcome of a particular case whether
13.

See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).

14.

An example of the supervisory standard in the pre-Mapp era was the federal exclusionary

rule.
15.

With respect to search and seizure, in decisions prior to Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.

301 (1957), the Court was explicit in distinguishing standards required by the Constitution

and standards set by the Court. Thus, the fourth amendment's prohibition was phrased in
terms of "no unreasonable searches and seizures." However, the federal exclusionary rule was
not deemed a constitutional requisite.
16. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
17. A discussion of whether the Court is applying the fifth amendment's prohibition against
self-incrimination to the states using the fourteenth amendment as a "funnel" or whether
the Court is merely announcing that due process, per se, impliedly contains the privilege in
the same degree that it is present in the fifth amendment is fruitless, since the result is the same.
18.
19.

20.
21.

268 U.S. 652 (1925).

374 U.S. 23 (1963).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).

(Emphasis added.)
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governed by the fifth or fourteenth amendment ought to be the same.
Hence the fifth amendment is accorded the same role as the first, fourth
and sixth amendments. Having established the formula applied to those
amendments, the coup-de-grace is effectively administered to the notion
of dual standards - one for federal courts and still another for state
courts.
What is accorded is a privilege of refusing to incriminate one's self,
and the feared prosecution may be by either federal or state authorities.
... It would be incongruous to have different standards determine the
validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution,
depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court.
Therefore, the same standards must determine whether 22
an accused's
silence in either a federal or state proceeding is justified.

Thus in one fell swoop all the standards applied in all of the Court's opinions with respect to self-incrimination would seem to be applied to the
states.
The changes that this decision will effect in state criminal procedures
are immense, but not troublesome. State courts should have little difficulty in adjusting to this change. The "right to counsel" decision in
Gideon has, and will continue to have, vast economic ramifications with
respect to the cost inherent in providing counsel for indigents. The
"search and seizure" decision in Mapp had a great impact on the effectiveness of law enforcement. The Malloy decision, however, presents no economic problem and should cause little more than a ripple with respect to
changes in law enforcement. Nevertheless, the Malloy decision has a
great impact on Ohio criminal procedure.
Ohio is one of the few jurisdictions which allows a prosecuting attorney to comment upon the failure of an accused to testify in his own behalf."3 The Ohio Constitution as well as the Ohio Revised Code permit
a prosecuting attorney to comment upon the unwillingness of the accused
to testify. The Ohio Constitution is explicit in providing for this procedure.
No person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness
against himself; but his failure to testify may be considered
24 by the court
and jury and may be the subject of comment by counsel.
The language in the Code is similar.25
It is difficult to conceive of a more latent contradiction than that presented by the Ohio Constitution on the matter of self-incrimination. On
the one hand, the privilege against self-incrimination is allegedly preserved, and, on the other hand, it is dissipated and rendered of no value.
The accused is, therefore, "on the horns of a dilemma." If he chooses to
testify he will undoubtedly be subjected to a withering cross-examination.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 11. (Emphasis added.)
See Annot., 171 A.L.R. 1267 (1947); Annot., 104 A.L.R. 478 (1936).
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10.
OHIo REv. CoDEB 2945.43.

1964]

Self-Incrimination

If he chooses to exercise his privilege not to testify, he will be subjected to
a base innuendo which is expressly sanctioned by the Ohio Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court has, in federal prosecutions, condemned the practice of commenting on the failure of the accused to testify.
In 1893, the Court held in Wilson v. United States26 that the failure of an
accused to testify in his own behalf "shall not create any presumption
'
against him."27
The Court then stated that permitting counsel to comment could not be tolerated.
To prevent such presumption being created, comment, especially hostile
comment, upon such failure must necessarily be excluded from the jury.
The minds of the jurors can only remain unaffected from this circumstance by excluding all reference to it.28
Thus, the Court enunciated the federal supervisory standard condemning
the practice of comment. Again in 1943, the Court in Johnson v. United
States29 inveighed a prosecutor's comment on the exercise of the privilege
by an accused. While the Court in Wilson was primarily concerned with
an adverse effect on a jury, the Court in Johnson related the practice of
comment directly to the privilege against self-incrimination, stating:
When it [the court] grants the claim of privilege but allows it to be
used against the accused to his prejudice, we cannot disregard the matter. That procedure has such potentialities of oppressive use that we
will not sanction its use in the federal courts over which we have supervisory powers.30
Therefore, it is apparent that the practice of commenting on the failure of
an accused to testify in his own behalf has, for a considerable period of
time, been declared antithetical to the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. Yet, prior to Malloy, this federal standard had not
been imputed to the states via the fourteenth amendment. In Adamson v.
California,3 the petitioner argued that the prosecutor's comment on his
failure to testify abridged his fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination. After indicating that this practice was forbidden in federal
courts, the Court apologetically answered the petitioner's urgings.
It is settled law that the clause of the Fifth Amendment, protecting a

person against being compelled to be a witness against himself, is not
made effective by the Fourteenth Amendment as a protection against
state action on the ground that freedom from testimonial compulsion
is a right of national citizenship, or because it is a personal privilege or
immunity secured by the Federal Constitution as one of the rights of
man that are listed in the Bill of Rights.32
26.

149 U.S. 60 (1893).

27. Id. at 65. (All italicized in original.)
28. IIbd.
29. 318 U.S. 189 (1943).
30. Id. at 199. (Emphasis added.)
31. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).

32. Id. at 51.

(Emphasis added.)
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Hence, the court in Adamson declared that the practice of commenting on
the failure of an accused to testify, although prohibited in federal courts,
was inapplicable to state criminal prosecutions. Conversely, Mr. Justice
Black, dissenting in Adamson, believed that the federal standards were
applicable to state procedure. Providing a lucid historical analysis,3" Justice Black's establishment of a solid legal basis for future extensions
has been ignored by the present Court. Justice Black concluded that the
historical events surrounding the passage of the fourteenth amendment
as well as the expressions of the proponents of the amendment made it
clear to him
that one of the chief objects that the provisions of the Amendment's
first section, separately, and as a whole, were intended 4to accomplish
was to -make the Bill of Rights, applicable to the states.8
Following the reversal of Twining and Adamson by Malloy, no other conclusion can be reached but that the proviso of the Ohio Constitution authorizing a prosecutor to comment on the failure of an accused to testify
is unconstitutional in light of the proscriptions in the Malloy case.
Malloy v. Hogan" represents no more than an anticipated result
emanating from the spirit of Mapp v. Ohio."0 The decision will produce
joy in the camps of those who decry a state-federal dichotomy of process,
and only additional sorrow for those who bemoan the loss of autonomy
in state criminal courts. The Supreme Court has taken another step forward (or backward depending on one's viewpoint) to the almost certain
eventuality of including the entire Bill of Rights in the fourteenth amendment.
HARRY T. QUICK
33. Id. at 92-123. (dissenting opinion)
34. Id. at 70-72. (Emphasis added.) It is unfortunate that Mr. Justice Brennan did not
see fit in Malloy to adopt Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Adamson, at least with
respect to Justice Black's analysis of the fifth amendment's applicability to state criminal procedure. At present, Malloy offers state courts no guidance in cases with facts not similar to
those in that case. Admittedly the Supreme Court, de jure, renders only case by case determinations. However the far-reaching effect of a Supreme Court opinion extends beyond
narrow fact similarities. Had the Court adopted, even in dictum, the broad scholarly base
outlined by Justice Black, states would have been provided with an indication of what the
standard will be in the future.
35. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
36. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

